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KENNETH SALZBERG*

The Dog That Didn't Bark: Assessing
Damages for Valid Regulatory Takings
"Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw
my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock
Holmes.1
ABSTRACT
If land use regulations that go "too far" are really takings under
the Fifth Amendment, one would expect there to be a large
number of cases discussing the appropriate way to calculate the
"just compensation" for those regulations that are otherwise
valid. Oddly there are none. This article explores the reasons for
that lack. The lack of any such cases and the problems with any
such compensation remedy stem from the confusion in
contemporary "takings" jurisprudence. In analyzing the
hundreds of cases that discuss "regulatory takings," it becomes
clear that the courts recognize that any remedy granting
compensation for such "takings" would present more problems
than it might solve. Most of this confusion would be resolved by
treating "regulatory takings" as violations of the Due Process
Clause ratherthan the Takings Clause.
INTRODUCTION
In a previous article,2 I argued that the current lack of clarity in
"takings" law is a result of the Supreme Court's disdain for land use
*
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for helping me put my ideas into more or less readable form, and to my wife, Pat Price, for
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1. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in II THE ANNOTATED SHERLOCK HoLMES: THE
FouR NOVELS AND THE FIFTY-SIX SHORT STORIES COMPLETE 261, 277 (William S. Baring-

Gould ed., 2d ed. 1967).
2. Kenneth Salzberg, "Takings" as Due Process, or Due Process as "Takings"?, 36 VAL. U.
L. REV. 413 (2002). Consistent with the author's prior article, the author will be using
takings without quotation marks when referring to traditional physical takings and
"takings" with quotation marks to refer to regulatory takings.
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regulations and its misguided campaign to use the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment 3 to limit such regulations. This campaign has resulted
in a body of law that is paradoxical, chaotic, and confused. 4 I further
argued that a proper-and more useful-analysis would involve
application of the Due Process Clause of the same amendment to
contested regulations. Such an analysis would establish a clear, logical,
and valid basis for considering land use regulations; bad regulations
would be struck down but would not garner compensation for the
owner.
Not surprisingly, there has been no change in the Supreme
Court's analysis of regulatory takings law notwithstanding the confusion
the takings analysis perpetuates. The majority of cases in this area have
been procedural rather than explanatory, and the explanatory cases have
done little to clarify the muddle. The lower courts continue to use the
Supreme Court's takings analysis as a template, struggling with the
inevitable consequences of deciding cases on the basis of the Takings
Clause rather than through due process. A practical problem arises out
of such an approach: once regulations are found to impose a "regulatory
taking," how do the courts proceed in determining just compensation, as
seems to be required under the Fifth Amendment?
In an attempt to understand this problem, I investigated how the
lower courts assess compensation for those otherwise valid regulations
that they determine are "takings." I searched for cases where courts
found that regulations that diminished the value of land were valid (that
is, not violations of the Due Process Clause), yet nonetheless effected
"takings" for which compensation was granted. I intended to critique the
formulas the courts used for calculating the appropriate compensation.
Much to my surprise, I could find no such cases.
Evidently, courts are not granting compensation for "valid
regulatory takings"; instead, landowners' demands for compensation are
being met with other remedies. There seems to be no middle ground: the
courts either strike a regulation down or uphold it without any
discussion of possible measures for compensating valid regulatory
takings. Just as in Sherlock Holmes' case of the dog that didn't bark, the
judicial silence here is significant.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V (1978) (" [N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."). The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is made applicable to
the states and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (citing Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226,239 (1897)).
4. See Salzberg, supranote 2, at 414 n.11.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor be deprived of.. .property, without due process of
law...").
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Why the judicial silence on this issue? In order to approach this
question, I first sketch the history of the idea of "regulatory takings" to
provide essential background and briefly review the concept of real
takings. I then proceed to describe the seven kinds of regulatory takings
(or actions landowners allege are takings), including in that discussion
the typical remedies the courts grant when they side with the
landowners. I argue that most of these regulatory actions are not takings,
but are rather violations of the Due Process Clause.
Next I consider the category of regulatory takings that is most
germane to my argument: valid, non-total takings cases based on
regulatory actions that go "too far." 6 These are the cases that should
result in compensation if the takings template is applied. I then look at
examples of takings cases that should have been decided by the "takings
template" 7 but were not. Finally, I examine some hypothetical remedies
that would satisfy the takings template and suggest why they cannot
work.
My conclusion is that courts are applying the takings template in
regulatory cases with increasing frequency while ignoring the logical
"takings" remedy of just compensation. Their silence is a tacit admission
that compensation is the wrong remedy for bad regulations -that there
is in fact no such thing as a "valid regulatory taking" that deserves "just
compensation."
THE CONFUSED IDEA OF REGULATORY "TAKINGS" AND ITS
DISCONTENTS
Government seizure of property without compensation is
expressly prohibited by the Fifth Amendment and made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 In what are called "true"
takings cases, a landowner alleges that the government has physically
taken his or her property. If the landowner prevails, the remedy is "just
compensation." If the landowner loses and the court finds that the
government did not take the property, there is of course no remedy for
the landowner. 9
6. This is a reference to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s remark in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 395, 414 (1922) ("[I]f a regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
7. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. On the other hand, in a similar type of case, when a landowner prevails on a claim
that an action by the government deprived him of his property in violation of the Due
Process Clause, the remedy is to invalidate the application of the regulation to that
particular parcel.
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For many years after the passage of the Bill of Rights, the
Supreme Court decided very few cases under the takings clause. Those
cases that were decided either agreed that the action of the government
was a taking and ordered compensation to be paid 1° or determined that
the action was not a taking and dismissed the suit." During the same
period, regulations that affected the use of land, such as zoning, were
also litigated but were decided under the Due Process Clause.1 2 In those
cases, if the Court decided that the regulation was in violation of the Due
Process Clause, it either struck down the regulation or refused to allow it
13
to be applied to the land in question.
In the late twentieth century, however, there has been a
politically motivated campaign to use the Fifth Amendment to fight
governmental land use regulation. 14 The professed justification for this
campaign can be traced to Holmes (Oliver Wendell, not Sherlock). In
1922, Justice Holmes remarked in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that "if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 15 Although this

10. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871). This case involved a stateauthorized dam that flooded Pumpelly's property. Id. The Supreme Court ordered
compensation to be awarded to Pumpelly for the loss of value of the flooded land.
Although the state had not taken the actual title to the property, they had begun to use it.
Id. This is an early example of what have come to be called "inverse condemnation" cases.
11. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (The regulation
prohibited Goldblatt from continuing to operate his sand and gravel mine on his property
in the city of Hempstead. The land had been mined since 1927 but had reached the water
table, and the resulting lake presented enough danger to allow the court to conclude that
the regulation was reasonable and not a taking.).
12. See Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13. Two years after the Euclid case was decided, the court found that a zoning
ordinance, as applied to the plaintiff's land, was arbitrary and unreasonable and forbad its
application to the subject property. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
14. See Carl Pope, Takings: The New Politics, Speech to the Commonwealth Club, San
Francisco, Cal. (June 31, 1995), available at http://www.spectacle.org/196/takings.html
(last visited Dec. 10, 2005). See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995).
15. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). In May 1921, the Pennsylvania
legislature passed the Kohler Act. Id. at 412. This statute prohibited the mining of anthracite
coal in any manner that may cause a home to deteriorate. Id. at 412-13. Prior to the
enactment of this law, the parties executed a deed that conveyed the surface rights. Id. at
412. Under the police power, the court found that states have the ability to regulate
property and cause a diminution in the value of that property by those regulations;
however, the ability to regulate and diminish property values "must have its limits or the
contract and due process clauses are gone." Id. at 413. The Court went on to find that in this
situation, where a contract was executed prior to the enactment of the law, the court should
invalidate the application of the law to the particular parcel and allow the mining to
continue. Id. at 416.

Winter 20061

VALID REGULATORY TAKINGS

remark was probably meant figuratively, 16 the error in taking it literally
has caused nearly as much trouble as the deliberate ignoring of the first
17
clause of the Second Amendment.
In Mahon, the Court addressed a Pennsylvania statute that
prohibited coal companies from mining in such a way as to cause the
overlying land to collapse. The Court struck down the statute as applied
to Pennsylvania Coal but ordered no compensation. If the Court had
applied the clause literally, rather than figuratively, it would have
ordered compensation to be paid. Clearly the Mahon Court did not think
that any property belonging to the Pennsylvania Coal Company had
been confiscated by the State of Pennsylvania. If it had so believed, it
would have ordered the lower court to take evidence on and compute
the compensation due the coal company.
In the 1970s, for the first time in the 50 years since Mahon was
decided, the Supreme Court began to take Holmes' "too far" remark as if
it had been intended literally and began to call all cases where a
regulation went too far "regulatory takings." In almost all of those cases,
however, the remedy remained a due process violation remedy: striking
down the regulation or refusing to allow it to be applied to the land in
question. In the last 30 years the Court has decided a considerable
18
number of land use regulation cases using this "takings template"
without awarding compensation.
Once the Court began, ostensibly, to treat regulations that went
"too far" as takings, an elaborate taxonomy of cases and exceptions was
needed to fit the ultimate outcomes into the template. Compensation was
still ordered in the "traditional" case where the landowner suffered a
permanent physical invasion. 19 Compensation was also the remedy in
those cases where the regulation was found by the state court to have
deprived the owner of all economically beneficial use2° (except where the
16. See Louise A. Halper, Tropes of Anxiety and Desire: Metaphor and Metonymy in the
Law of Takings, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 31 (1996).
17. See, for instance, a rather measured consideration of this issue in Akhil Reed Amar,
Second Thoughts: Enduring and Empowering The Bill of Rights in the Third Millennium, 65 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoBs. 103 (2002).
18. I use "takings template" to refer to the various criteria used to put land use
regulations into one or the other of the categories of cases discussed in the "Seven Types of
Takings" section of this article.
19. See generally Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (1991) (holding that the
Environmental Protection Agency's requirement and subsequent placement of groundwater monitoring wells on private property constituted a physical taking and granting the
lower court power to award damages); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (finding evidence of a taking when a cable was installed on a New York
landlord's building and leaving the determination of compensation to the state court).
20. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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regulation prohibited a "nuisance like" activity 21). In all other cases, the
Court used the multiple factors identified in Penn Central to decide if the
regulation was the "functional equivalent" of a real taking. 22
The "takings template" is notorious for its confusion and lack of
clear rules. In a recent session, the Supreme Court, in a rent control case,
again had to explain the template, ultimately remanding the case
because the lower court had applied the template incorrectly. 23 The
Court held that the lower courts were mistaken in deciding that the
ordinance was a taking because "[it did] not substantially advance
legitimate state interests." 24 This approach once again changes the
criteria that the lower courts were seemingly required to apply in
deciding "regulatory takings" cases.
The confusion over criteria for "regulatory takings" cases
translates into confusion over the remedy in those cases. If a landowner
loses on what has come to be called a "regulatory takings" claim, the
ordinance or law is simply upheld, notwithstanding the diminution in
the value of the land. 25 However, when the landowner prevails in such a
case, instead of calculating what would be just compensation, as is
consistently done in physical taking cases, courts simply invalidate the
regulation -either in general or as applied to the land in question.26 The
21. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
22. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The factors laid out
in Penn Central form the test used to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred.
Id. at 124. These factors include the evaluation of (1) the economic impact of the regulation
on the landowner, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the
landowner's investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government
regulation. Id.
23. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). In Lingle, the Hawaii legislature
passed a rent control ordinance applicable to gas station leases designed to ameliorate the
high cost of gasoline in Hawaii. Id.
24. Id. at 2077. The lower court had found that the ordinance would not, in fact, have
an effect on gas prices. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, held that
"the 'substantially advances' formula" (which had been mentioned in a line of cases
beginning in 1980) is not an appropriate test for determining what constitutes a "taking."
Id. at 2087.
25. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(validating the constitutionality of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act and finding no
evidence of a regulatory taking); Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.
1996) (finding no evidence of a taking and upholding an ordinance revoking rental licenses
of landlords who allowed criminal activity to continue on their properties); Arcadia Dev.
Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding a city
ordinance requiring relocation expenses to be paid to mobile home park tenants by owners
who chose to close the park and denying any evidence of a taking).
26. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Mahon, a deed conveyed the surface
of a particular parcel of land but reserved the right to remove all the coal under the
property. Id. at 412. In May 1921, the State of Pennsylvania passed an act commonly called
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question then arises whether this sort of situation is actually a "taking"
at all, since its remedy drastically diverges from the constitutionally
mandated and long-established doctrine of just compensation in takings
jurisprudence.
UNAMBIGUOUS CASES
To understand the taxonomy of regulatory takings cases, which I
discuss below, it will be helpful to differentiate "regulatory takings"
from the sort of takings they are not: real takings or denials of due
process. While these two types of cases are important, and can also be
controversial, 27 neither is the subject of this article, which is damages for
"regulatory takings."
Real Takings
Real takings involve situations where the government actually
physically takes property from a private individual -for instance, when
the state takes title to real property for a road or court house. Courts
have long held that any physical expropriation, no matter how small, is a
taking for which the state should be required to pay 'just compensation'
to the ex-property owner. 28
The usual remedy in the case of a physical taking is to grant the
landowner money damages, the measure of which is determined by the
market value of the property taken. After payment of those damages, the
government owns the property. This principle applies to a real taking of
any interest in land, be it a present fee simple, a future interest in the
title, a mineral right, or an easement. Thus, in Loretto v. Teleprompter

the Kohler Act. Id. The act essentially restricts mining of any anthracite coal that will
negatively impact any structure. Id. at 413. This act would destroy any property rights that
were conveyed in the deed. Id. The Court invalidated the act as applied to the property
because the structure that would possibly be endangered by the mining was a private
home, not a public building and, thus, there was little public interest or concern. Id.
Additionally, the court found that the act did not further the police power of enhancing
public safety; instead, it greatly restricted any use of the estate for mining and, thus, the
court exempted the particular parcel from the act. Id. at 414.
27. See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (a recent
controversial "public use" case).
28. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 453 U.S. 410 (1982). In that case,
the City of New York required apartment building owners to allow cable companies to
string wire over the roofs of their apartments. Id.
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Manhattan CATV Corp., despite the small amount of property taken, the
owner was compensated -in that case with payment of one dollar.29
29. There is a rich and interesting literature on the question of just how such
compensation is to be calculated, and on resolving the many inequities the doctrine
generates. For example, how do we decide equitable compensation when land is taken for a
freeway exit ramp? Does the owner of a small parcel, all of which is taken for the freeway
exit ramp, get the market value of the whole parcel? Does the owner of a large parcel, a
small part of which is taken for the exit ramp and the remainder of which increases
substantially in value because of the location of the ramp, get nothing? Whether the second
owner should get the same compensation as the first is a complicated and controversial
question. Compare Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470
(1973) with United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973), discussed in United States v. 42.13
Acres of Land, 73 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1996), where the court stated:
The United States took Almota's grain elevator, which was on land leased
from a railroad. The government proposed to pay for the value of the
elevator assuming Almota would lose its right to use the property when
the lease expired in 7 1/2 years. Almota offered proof that, were it not for
the condemnation, a willing buyer would pay something additional for
the expectation that the railroad would renew the lease. The Court noted
that an existing tenant usually has the inside track for a renewal, the
landlord has an interest in keeping its property leased, and the
government "may not take advantage of any depreciation in the property
taken that is attributable to the project itself." The concurring Justices
pointed out that Almota had agreed to bear the risk that the railroad
would change its plans, but not that the government would condemn the
property for another use. The Court therefore held affirmatively, on the
question of, "whether, upon condemnation of a leasehold, a lessee with no
right of renewal is entitled to receive as compensation the market value of
its improvements without regard to the remaining term of its lease,
because of the expectancy that the lease would have been renewed."
Id. at 956. On the same day Almota came down, the Supreme Court went the other way in
United States v. Fuller,409 U.S. 488 (1973). In Fuller,a rancher raised cattle on land different
parts of which he owned in fee simple, leased from the state, and licensed from the federal
government under revocable Taylor Grazing Act permits. Id. The federal government
condemned some of the fee simple land. Id. The dispute was over whether fair
compensation for the fee simple land should include the increased value of the fee land on
account of the grazing permits. Id. The grazing permits of course increased the practicality
of raising cattle on the fee lands. Id. The Court held that the government did not have to
"pay for that element of value based on the use of respondent's fee lands in combination
with the Government's permit lands." Id. at 493. The principle was that "the Government
as condemnor may not be required to compensate a condemnee for elements of value that
the Government has created, or that it might have destroyed under the exercise of
governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain." Id. at 498. The Court
expressly noted that "we do not suggest that such a general principle may be pushed to its
ultimate logical conclusion." Id. at 492. See, e.g., Christopher A. Bauer, Government Takings
and Constitutional Guarantees: When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny Just Compensation, 2003
BYU. L. REV. 265; Marilyn F. Drees, Do State Legislatures Have a Role in Resolving the "Just
Compensation" Dilemma? Some Lessons from Public Choice and Positive Political Theory, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (1997); Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L.
REV. 531 (1995). These, however, are not "regulatory takings" issues and thus are not
addressed in this article.
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Due Process Violations
Due process violation cases are sometimes referred to as takings
cases because using a "takings" framework seems more current than
spelling out why the regulation in question violates the Due Process
Clause. 3° However, unlike more conventional "regulatory takings" cases,
the landowners in these cases are not arguing that the regulations
diminish the value of their property too much, even if the regulations are
otherwise rational and valid. Instead, the landowners argue that there is
something unfair or arbitrary about the regulations, or that they regulate
an area over which the government does not have any valid regulatory
power. 31 In this sort of case, the first line of attack for the landowner is to
challenge the regulation generally, 32 without relying on its specific
application to her individual property. 33 A famous example of a facial
attack on a landuse regulation is the case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v.

30. See Salzberg, supra note 2, at 435.
31. These are the factors that determine whether a landowner's rights under the due
process clause have been violated.
32. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 294 (1981).
In Hodel, the appellees facially challenged the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
without reference to a specific parcel of property affected by the act. Id. at 295. The Court
was reluctant to entertain facial challenges to regulatory ordinances and statutes because
the very nature of takings jurisprudence is an "ad hoc, factual inquiry" that is specific to
each particular parcel. Id. However, it did examine whether the mere enactment of the act
constituted a taking. Id. In this analysis, the Court noted that "[a] statute regulating the
uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it 'denies an owner economically viable
use of his land.'" Id. at 296. The Court found that the act did not take away all viable uses of
the land because it only prohibited mining near certain locales and did not "categorically
prohibit surface mining," and thus there was no taking. Id. See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that the enactment of a zoning regulation limiting the
permitted number of residential lots did not constitute a facial taking as the ordinance was
designed to prohibit the ill effects of urbanization and provide for the "careful and orderly"
development of the city); Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (denying a facial attack on a
rent control ordinance).
33. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 294-95. Facial attacks on regulations by landowners are
seldom successful. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
495 (1987). In Keystone, coal companies brought a facial attack on the Subsidence Act,
claiming that the overall act inhibited their ability to mine coal. Id. at 478. The Court noted
the difficulty in deciding facial attacks in regulatory takings cases because the inquiry into
a regulatory takings case is highly fact-specific with regard to a particular piece of property
and in facial attacks there are no individual parcels to examine. Id. at 494. The Court went
on to note that the only review that it could undertake was an examination of whether the
"mere enactment" of the Act constituted a taking. Id. The test used in this analysis is
whether the "statute regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a
taking... [and] denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Id. at 495. The Court
acknowledged that this type of challenge would be an "uphill battle." Id. See also, e.g., Hodel
452 U.S. at 295-96.
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Ambler Realty Co., 34 in which the U.S. Supreme Court first upheld a city's
35
power to impose zoning regulations in general.
A second line of attack for a landowner is to challenge the
specific application of the regulation. 36 Here the landowner is not asking
the court to invalidate the entire regulation, but to forbid its application
to her particular parcel of land. For example, a landowner might appeal
a denial of a variance, arguing that the zoning ordinance that forbids
building closer than 15 feet from a street should not apply to her lot
because the lot is narrower than most. The claim is not that a 15 foot
setback requirement is irrational or invalid in general, but rather that it
37
creates a hardship to the particular owner.
In this type of case, the court must determine whether the
regulation is a denial of the landowner's due process of law because it
unfairly burdens her use of the land. If the court finds this is true, the
remedy is to strike down the regulation as applied to the particular land
in question. 38 If no due process violation is found, the controversy may
39
still be considered under a takings clause analysis.
34. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
35. Id. See also Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1987). Lacking standing to challenge the enactment of a zoning ordinance, the
plaintiff was forced to facially challenge the act or allege that the "mere enactment" of the
ordinance constituted a taking. Id. at 877. To make a successful facial attack on a regulation,
a plaintiff must show that (1) the regulation does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests or (2) it denies an owner economically viable use of his or her land. Id. The
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that all economically viable uses are prohibited on
the land; this task is an "uphill battle." Id. Because the availability of a variance and other
special uses might allow other economically beneficial uses of the property, the court
upheld the regulation as valid in its entirety. Id.
36. Id. at 876. In Lake Nacimiento, the Ranch owned property along the lake that was
zoned as Recreational. Id. at 874-75. The county later enacted a zoning ordinance that
changed this designation to Rural Lands. Id. The Ranch requested a change in the zoning to
allow 800 of its acres be zoned back to Recreational; however, this request was denied. Id.
The Ranch challenged this zoning as applied to its property as a governmental taking in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the court found that its takings claim
was not yet ripe. Id. at 877. See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 (1992)
(noting that the petitioner did not challenge the overall enactment of the Beachfront
Management Act, but solely the application of the act to his property).
37. See Town of Bass Lake v. Sawyer County Bd. of Appeals, 685 N.W.2d 173 (Wis.
App. 2004).
38. Substantive due process claims have been analyzed in the following cases: PFZ
Properties,Inc. v. Rodriguez, 739 F. Supp. 67, 72 (D.P.R. 1990) (stating that in order to prove a
substantive due process claim, political discrimination or "fundamental procedural
irregularity" must be shown); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 130 (1992)
(holding that the deprivation of liberty was not done in an arbitrary manner and, thus, the
substantive due process claim failed). However, arguing for substantive due process
protection in the area of regulatory takings can be hazardous to a landowner, as the
standard of review greatly favors the regulating authority. See Pace Res., Inc. v.
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SEVEN TYPES OF TAKINGS AND THEIR AMBIGUITIES: 4
"REGULATORY TAKINGS"
The Supreme Court's introduction of the "takings template" into
cases involving land use regulation has caused a great deal of
counterproductive ambiguity and controversy. 41 Far too many kinds of
cases now are called takings cases. As I, and many others, have said, this
area is "paradoxical, muddled, chaotic, confused ....
42 To make some
sense of this confused and ambiguous state of affairs, we should try to
sort out the various types of "takings" cases courts have dealt with.
There are seven types to consider, but only the last can really be
considered appropriate for monetary compensation under the "takings
template."
Total Regulatory Takings
In total regulatory takings cases, if the claim is upheld, the court
will impose one of three remedies: (1) enjoin the application of the
Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1034 (3d Cir. 1987) (denying substantive due process
claim); ABN 51st St. Partner v. City of N.Y., 724 F. Supp. 1142, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(denying substantive due process claim on ordinance that inhibited restoration of
building); Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming decision of district
court that there were no substantive due process claims based on the denial of a rezoning
application).
39. Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996). An ordinance requiring relocation expenses to be paid to mobile home tenants by the
park owners if the park were closed was challenged as applied to the park owned by
Mildred Collins and her husband William T. Collins. Id. at 284-85. In examining this
regulation, the court noted that when "legislation is not based on a suspect class and does
not infringe on a fundamental right, it need only be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose in order to withstand federal equal protection or substantive due
process challenges.... Legislation will fail rational basis review only when it rests on
grounds irrelevant to the achievement of a plausible governmental objective." Id. at 288.
The court held that the legislation advanced the substantial governmental interest of
protecting mobile home tenants and thus did not violate the equal protection or due
process clauses of the Constitution. Id. The court went on to note that the rational basis test
only requires the ordinance to be supported by specific known facts or those that could be
reasonably inferred. Id. at 289.
40. WILLIAM EMPsoN, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY (2d ed. 1947).
41. See generally Andrew S. Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory
Takings and Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REV. 571 (2003); Anthony Saul Alperin, The
"Takings" Clause: When Does Regulation "Go Too Far"?, 31 Sw. U. L. REV. 169 (2002); F. Patrick
Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad
Hoc Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 465 (2001); Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other "Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth Amendment
Takings of PrivateProperty FarOutweigh the "Rule," 29 ENVTL. L. 939 (1999).
42. See Salzberg, supra note 2, at 414 n.11.
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regulation to the particular plot of land, (2) require the state to change
the regulation, or (3) require the state to buy the land. The first and
second results are due process remedies. The third is a genuine taking
remedy: the state takes the title and the landowner receives monetary
compensation. Lucas was settled using the latter remedy. The state
bought the land from Lucas and later sold it, to a construction company,
which built a house on the lot. Ironically, soon after the house was
finished, the beach on which the house was built "suffered a 'temporary
erosion episode'" and is still in danger of being destroyed by a large
43
storm.
Nuisance-Like Regulatory Takings
Nuisance-like regulatory takings cases are typically those in
which a local government has passed regulations prohibiting dangerous
or offensive uses of land. In such cases, if the court finds that the activity
prohibited was in the nature of a nuisance, the court will uphold the
regulation. The court must decide if the landowner had the right, under
the state's common law, and perhaps also under the state's statutory law,
to carry out the prohibited activity at all. If a neighbor could have
stopped the regulated use in a private lawsuit, then the landowner did
not have the right to engage in that activity to begin with, and the
regulation has not taken anything away from the landowner that the
landowner had in the first place. Since the landowner could have been
stopped from engaging in the activity by a neighbor, the landowner is
44
not harmed when a governmental regulation precludes such activity.
One famous case in this area dealt with the prohibition of brick
yards or brick kilns in the City of Los Angeles.45 The property owner,
who had been operating a brick yard at the same location for seven
43. Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More
Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221, 239 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss
eds., 2004).
44. See generally Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996). The court
held that a taking did not occur upon the application of an ordinance that allowed for the
revocation of a rental license when a landlord allowed criminal activity to fester in his
apartment complex in violation of the ordinance. Id. The court found that the ordinance
had the lawful objective of ridding the neighborhood of nuisances and criminal activity.
The ordinance was merely a vehicle to ensure cooperation between landlords and city
officials and thus did not effect a taking. Id. See also, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Miller v. Schoene,'276 U.S. 272 (1928);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (cases finding that regulated activities
were nuisances or noxious uses of property and thus any proposed "taking" was not
compensable under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment).
45. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394.
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years, claimed that the regulation was a "taking" because it restricted
that particular use of his property. The court concluded that the
regulation was valid and no taking had occurred because operating a
brick yard in the midst of a residential area was a nuisance.
The proper approach in such a case, no matter to what extent the
theoretical value of the land is diminished by the regulation, is a finding
that the regulation's effect on the landowner is appropriate, and the
landowner loses.
Invalid Regulations
In invalid regulations cases, the landowner argues that the
regulation should not have been enacted. For example, the regulation
could be too vague and uncertain to give the landowner enough notice
of what she can or cannot do.46 The landowner could also argue that the
regulation, while valid on its face, is arbitrary and unreasonable when
47
applied to a particular parcel of land.
The usual remedy here is for the court to invalidate the
regulation or enjoin its application to the parcel. The landowner can then
do what had been prohibited under the invalid regulation. This is the
clearest example of using "takings" language to make what is essentially
a due process argument.48
Real Temporary Takings
Real temporary takings are actually a subset of physical takings.
The foundational cases in this area are analytically quite straightforward.
The framework for temporary takings cases comes from a number of
World War II cases where the government took over private warehouses
for the duration of the war. 49 Though the titles were not taken,
possession of the properties was taken for a period of time. Since there is
no relevant regulation at work here, but rather an actual appropriation of
land, albeit for a limited time, this is not a regulatory taking 50 and these
cases are correctly treated as real takings.
The remedy for temporary takings cases is clear. In the typical
case, the owner gets his warehouse back and is awarded compensation
46. See Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. App. 1993).
47. The first case of this sort is Nectow v. City of Cambridge,277 U.S. 183 (1928).
48. See supranotes 27-35 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
50. Id. at 378 ("Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been
held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the
subject matter, to amount to a taking.").
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for the period of time that the government had possession of the land,
measured by the reasonable rental value for the length of time the owner
51
did not have possession.
Temporary Regulatory Takings
Temporary regulatory takings cases are another example of due
process problems dressed up as takings. A regulation is struck down
because it, or its application, violated the due process rights of the
landowner. If the procedure to undo the regulation's application goes as
it should, the court does not grant the landowner any remedy for the loss
of the use of the property during the time the state is considering the
application of the regulation to the land. However, sometimes this takes
longer than it "should." The court has recognized that there is a normal
procedure that a government entity must go through in order to
overturn a regulation: hearings held, evidence gathered, repealing
actions published in the appropriate media, and meetings scheduled by
the relevant regulatory body. This process takes time, but if it takes too
long, or if the government unit refuses to repeal the regulation, then that
52
delay can make a case for a "temporary taking."
Monetary damages are granted in such cases. But granting
compensation in addition to striking down the invalid regulation seems
to be based on a penalty notion rather than a strict Fifth Amendment
takings analysis, since compensation is only granted when the regulatory
body takes too long to undo the invalid regulation. If the regulation were
a real taking, we have seen from Loretto that it should be compensated,
even if the taking were minimal. Because some diminution of value of
the use of the land is allowed without compensation (if the period is
short, and hence the value lost is small), granting compensation for the
excess wait must be a penalty.
An example of this type of case is a zoning ordinance that
forbids building a normal-sized house on an oddly shaped lot. Many
51. Id. at 382 ("The value of such an occupancy is to be ascertained, not by treating
what is taken as an empty warehouse to be leased for a long term, but what would be the
market rental value of such a building on a lease by the long-term tenant to the temporary
occupier.").
52. The first case in which the Supreme Court announced this doctrine was First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987),
in which Los Angeles County enacted a moratorium on building any structures in a canyon
that had been flooded after a rainstorm that destroyed all the then-existing buildings. This
case is another example of what is really an advisory opinion. Id. Upon remand, the
California appellate court found that there had been no taking at all, temporary or
otherwise. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 258 Cal. Rptr. 893
(App. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
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zoning ordinances for residential districts limit how close houses may be
built to the boundaries of the lot. For most lots of rectangular shape,
these setback limits create few problems. However, in the case of an
oddly shaped lot, a normal-sized house may need to be built closer to a
boundary of the lot than is allowed under the ordinance. Normally, the
landowner would apply for a variance and eventually, after a few
months of hearings at various levels, get the variance, allowing the house
to be built. But if the city is recalcitrant and does not allow the variance,
the court may grant damages for the excess time the landowner had to
wait. Unless the court begins granting damages for the entire time the lot
was subject to the ordinance before the granting of the variance, the
"temporary takings" damages are clearly a penalty for the foot-dragging
53
of the zoning authority, not compensation for the actual loss of use.
A similar issue arises where a moratorium is enacted that
prohibits some sorts of development on property for a specified amount
of time. 54 Since most of these moratoria are upheld, any compensation
for an excess period of time such a moratorium lasts is again a penalty
for the excess time, not compensation for loss of use.
Emergency Takings
Emergency takings occur where property is substantially
destroyed, but in an emergency. The oldest of these cases are those in

53. See, e.g., Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992), petition for reversal denied (Minn. Jan 15, 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 960 (1993)
(The court stated that "First English does not create a new liability standard to determine
when a "temporary" taking occurs, but clarifies the appropriate remedy after a taking is
recognized."). It is uncertain whether the term "temporary taking" as employed by First
English was even intended to apply to planning moratoriums. The opinion seems to
presuppose that "temporary regulatory takings" means "regulatory takings which are
ultimately invalidated by the courts." Id. at 262.
54. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002). In Tahoe-Sierra, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), concerned about the
water quality and unique characteristics of the nearby lake, imposed a moratorium on
construction on land surrounding the lake until the TRPA had time to determine what
amount of development could be done without jeopardizing the quality of the lake. Id. at
310. This moratorium was enacted for eight months. Id. at 310-11. Due to complications in
planning work and public controversy, the moratorium was extended, lasting a full 32
months. Id. at 312. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the moratorium and found it
was not a compensable taking. Id. at 342-43. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987). In First English, a religious organization operated a
camp for handicapped youth, which was flooded. Id. at 307. In response to the flooding, the
city adopted an interim ordinance preventing construction on the flood plain where the
camp was located. Id. The result was that the organization was prevented from rebuilding
its camp as long as the ordinance was in effect. Id.
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which buildings have been set on fire to prevent a larger fire from
spreading or due to the exigencies of war. 55
Other more recent examples have arisen from California
earthquakes, where buildings have been too dangerous to enter and both
the buildings and the valuable personal property in them have been
56
destroyed in the interest of public safety.
Such cases uniformly result in no award of compensation to the
land or property owner, regardless of the percentage of destruction
because of the state's need to respond to an act of nature. The public, of
course, does not use the destroyed property in any sense. Moreover, the
potential harm to the public if the structure is not demolished is very
great. Thus, part of the calculus seems to be the degree of necessity on
the part of the state to take the action that destroys the property.
An examination of these six kinds of "regulatory takings" cases
reveals that none are clear-cut cases of "regulatory takings" requiring
compensation. Two types of cases are real takings (or total takings that
are treated as real takings) where the state, on behalf of the public,
actually takes something from the landowner and pays for it. Two others
are cases where the state is acting, through the imposition of the
regulation, in an inappropriate way (temporary takings and invalid
regulations). In such cases the state is prohibited from imposing the
regulation on the landowner, and the suit results in the landowner not
being subject to the challenged regulation at all. The last two are cases
where the state is allowed to impose some harm on the landowner
(emergency destruction, and valid regulatory takings that do not go too
far) where the harm does not impose an undue burden on the
57
landowner, at least in relation to the harm that is being prevented.

55. See, e.g., United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) (denying
compensation for the government's forced closing of plaintiff's gold mine to facilitate
wartime production during World War II); United States v. Caltrex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952)
(denying compensation where plaintiff's property was destroyed by retreating American
troops in the Philippines during the Japanese invasion of those islands during World War
II).
56. See DIS, Your Partner in Earthquake Protection, http://www.dis-inc.com/
northrid.htm (last visited May 10, 2006); DIANA TODD ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., SPECIAL PUBL'N No. 862, 1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE: PERFORMANCE OF
STRUCrURES, LIFELINES, AND FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 54-55 (1994), http://fire.nist.gov/

bfrlpubs/build94/PDF/b94060.pdf (discussing the Barrington Bldg).
57. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly could go on if
to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law.").
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Valid Non-Total Regulatory Takings That Go "Too Far"
That brings us to the crucial issue this article aims to address:
regulations that are valid (i.e., that do not run afoul of the due process
clause) but nonetheless impose too great an obligation on a landowner.
These cases fit all the criteria of the Supreme Court's "takings
template." First, the regulations are valid; that is, they do not violate the
landowners' rights under the Due Process Clause. They are rational, not
arbitrary; clear enough to follow; and further some power that the state
has. Nor do they result in a total diminution of value -there are some
valuable uses that landowners can engage in that do not violate the
regulation. However, the claims on the part of the landowners are that
the degree of diminution of value is so great that the regulations fit
Justice Holmes' measure: they go "too far."
To evaluate such claims, the lower court must weigh a number
of factors under the Supreme Court's Penn Central analysis and come to a
conclusion about the regulation's effect on the interests of the
landowner.m If the court concludes that the regulation does not go "too
far," then the regulation is upheld and the landowner loses the case. In
those situations, the court finds nothing wrong with the regulation and
nothing wrong with applying the regulation to a particular parcel in
question. Even though the regulation may well diminish the value of the
parcel to which it applies, if the court concludes, after applying the Penn
Central test, that the diminution of value is not excessive, then the
conclusion that the regulation does not go "too far" follows.

58. As Justice O'Connor explained again in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 63234 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring):
[Riegulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Court in
Penn Central acknowledged that it had hitherto been "unable to develop
any 'set formula'" for evaluating regulatory takings claims, but identified
"several factors that have particular significance." Id. at 124. Primary
among those factors are "the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations." Ibid. In addition,
the "character of the governmental action"-for instance whether it
amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests
through "some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good"-may be relevant in
discerning whether a taking has occurred. Ibid. The Penn Central factorsthough each has given rise,to vexing subsidiary questions- have served as
the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not
fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001).
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If, on the other hand, the court concludes that the regulation
does go "too far," then what should happen? The court should not
invalidate the regulation, nor should it refuse to allow the regulation to
be applied to the land, since the regulation has been found to be valid on
its face and as applied. Nor should the court dismiss the suit since the
regulation goes "too far." If we are reading Holmes' phrase literally, we
should conclude that the application of the regulation violates the
takings clause.
The takings clause states that, when courts conclude that
"private property has been taken for public use" (where the state has
"taken" the private property), the courts should award compensation.
But they do not.
IllustrativeHypothetical
Hypothetically, let's assume the case of an owner of a
dilapidated old house of historical interest.5 9 If the house is located in a
city-designated historical preservation district, extensive rules surround
any proposed changes to the structure. 60 For instance, the owner may not
be allowed to change the facade, the interior layout, or even the
61
mechanicals without permission from a historical preservation board.
59. This example is based upon the Penn Central case. That case centered on the
designation of Grand Central Terminal in midtown Manhattan as a historic site. Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 115. Grand Central opened in 1913 and is noted as "providing an
ingenious engineering solution to the problems presented by urban railroad stations, but
also as a magnificent example of French beaux-arts style." Id. The terminal is an eight-story
building, predominately used as a railway station, with some leased commercial space. Id.
A 20-story office tower was originally planned as part of Grand Central Terminal but was
never constructed. Id. This structure was owned by Penn Central Transportation Company
and on August 2, 1967, the Commission designated the terminal a landmark; Penn Central
Transportation Company opposed the designation but did not seek judicial review of the
decision. Id. at 115-16.
60. The enactment of historical preservation districts by states and municipalities is
quite common. Id. at 107. The reasons for such enactments are primarily to protect historic
structures and landmarks that have deteriorated without public attention to their historic
value. Id. The laws were also enacted due to a public outcry that these historic structures
should be saved as an educational part of the United States' heritage. Id. Pursuant to New
York City's Landmark Preservation Law, the owner of a landmark building was required
to keep the exterior features "in good repair." Id. at 112.
61. Id. According to Penn Central, an owner wishing to make alterations to a building
designated as "historic" must first apply for and obtain a "certificate of no effect on
protected architectural features," which affirms that the owner's changes will not impact
any architectural feature of the building. Id. The owner must then obtain a certificate of
"appropriateness" from the Commission. Id. In its approval process of this appropriateness
permit, the Commission evaluates the "aesthetic, historical, and architectural values -that
the proposed construction on the landmark site would not unduly hinder the protection,
enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the landmark." Id. There are also procedures
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For some landowners, the designation may in fact increase the value of
the house. For others, though, the costs and requirements of maintaining
the historically significant aspects of their house may be unduly
burdensome.
If the cost of necessary renovations, carried out as the historical
preservation board requires, exceeds the present value of the property,
and would be even more than the house would be worth after those
expensive renovations, it could be argued that the homeowner ought to
be free of some or all of the historical preservation board's requirements.62 This remedy, as a solution to the problem the homeowner faces,
would make a good deal of sense but would not be the sort of "just
compensation," or monetary payment, the takings clause seems to
require.
Do the regulations require renovations or upkeep that would
cost more than the building is worth, while at the same time prohibiting
the building from being torn down? Typically, if there is no way to keep
the historically important building safe and usable without spending
more than it is worth (and more than the owner is willing to spend) and
there is no public entity willing to take it over, the building will be torn
down. 63 This usually happens when the historical preservation board has
run out of options and allows the destruction. Occasionally, a court must
step in and order the board to cease enforcement of the historical
preservation regulations as applied to a particular building.
I have used a hypothetical case here because there simply are no
actual cases. There is no coherent way to articulate what the appropriate
measure of damages should be in this situation, any more than there is a
coherent theory of "regulatory takings." Once again the remedy, when

available to the landowner if the designation of his building as a historic building causes
him an economic hardship. Id.
62. The New York historical designation municipal ordinance at issue in Penn Central
did address some of these concerns. Id. If the landowner can show that he is not earning a
reasonable return on his property due to the designation, the Commission and city
agencies have the obligation of aiding the owner in developing a plan to earn a reasonable
income. Id. The plan can include "partial or complete tax exemption, remission of taxes,
and authorizations for alteration, construction, or reconstruction appropriate for and not
inconsistent with the purposes of law." Id. The owner then is given the opportunity to
accept or reject the plan. Id. If the plan is rejected, the Commission may then recommend
that the city purchase the property through eminent domain; however, if the city does not
act within a specified time frame, the Commission must allow for the property owner to
proceed on the alteration he requested in his certificate of appropriateness, but was denied
by the Commission. Id.
63. See Michael Fielding, Fate Decided for HistoricHomes, RED WING REPUBLICAN EAGLE,
Oct. 15, 2002 (the story of a historic house that the Red Wing, Minnesota city council
allowed to be torn down in part because of the cost of renovations).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

the regulation goes "too far," is to free the land from the regulatory
burden-to invoke the due process clause, but to refer to this unfair
burden as a "taking," as the following cases do, to the confusion of all.
CASES FINDING "UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS" WITHOUT
GRANTING "JUST COMPENSATION"
Many recent cases, inspired by the Supreme Court's takings
template, have found on behalf of landowners that land use regulations
result in "regulatory takings." Yet none of these courts have granted
compensation, as the Supreme Court's decisions would seem to
mandate. Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman64 is a classic example of such a case.
The Court in Stupak-Thrall found that a rule limiting the
plaintiff's use of motorized boats on a wilderness lake on which they
owned riparian land was an "unconstitutional taking." The riparian
landowners, faced with the horrific prospect of having to sail or row (or
even worse -telling paying guests that they would have to sail or row),
sued. The court granted the riparian landowners an injunction,
forbidding the Forest Service from enforcing the rule against the
plaintiffs rather than granting them any compensation. 65
This is the sort of absurd example of the use of takings
terminology to fix an unreasonable regulation: under the regulation at
issue in Stupak-Thrall, what private property is the public now using?
The noise the guests used to be able to make? The perspiration the
owners and their guests now would have to expend? The owner's
business is harmed -and, according to the court, harmed too much. "It is
unfair," the court should say, and then enjoin the application of the
66
regulation.
64. 988 F. Supp. 1055 (1997).
65. Id. at 1061.
66. There are many other cases that show how lower courts actually deal with
"unconstitutional takings." See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182
(2002) (holding that a rent control ordinance was an "unconstitutional taking"). There the
court found that there was no "public purpose" for the regulation (a classic violation of the
Due Process Clause). Id. Rather than straightforwardly finding such a due process
violation, the court seemed to invoke the takings clause. Id. However, the remedy the court
granted was to declare the ordinance unconstitutional, without ordering any
compensation. Id. In Scott v. Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion County, 2002
WL 31921295 (S.D. Ind.) (2002), the court agreed with the plaintiff that the defendant
county's unilateral vacation of a covenant that applied to three lots in a subdivision (to
allow the county to build a parking lot) was an "unconstitutional taking of private property
for a private use contrary to the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." What is the
remedy? - an injunction and a reinstatement of the covenant. These cases are a very small
sample of the many that can be found every year-cases where lower courts seem
compelled to discuss "unconstitutional takings" yet fail to apply the takings clause.
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SOME HYPOTHETICAL REMEDIES - AND WHY THE COURTS
HAVE NOT USED THEM
The problem is that we would be asking the court to employ

what is historically and logically a condemnation remedy-awarding
cash equal to what the state has taken from the private landowner and
transferred to public use - in a situation where nothing tangible has been
taken from the landowner. In a real takings case, the government is
buying the title from the landowner. In a regulation case, however, a
limit is being set on what the landowner can do on the land. The owner
still possesses the entire title to the land and can still prohibit the public

from using the land, while the government has received nothing from
the landowner.

As an experiment, suppose we take the court at its word and
accept the conclusion that these situations are "takings." What possible
measures of "just compensation" can we think of? What problems would
those measures create?
Pay the Entire Amount of the Diminution
This measure would compensate the landowner the entire
diminution of value the regulation imposed. But, this dog won't hunt.
One major problem with this approach is the vast difference between the
large amount the aggrieved landowner would receive and the lack of
any compensation paid to neighboring landowners. While most
landowners' land will increase in value due to the regulation - after all, a
valid regulation presumably fulfills some public good and so provides
an overall benefit to society-many landowners subject to the valid
regulation have land whose value is diminished by the regulation to
some degree. 67 Thus, only those whose land value is excessively
decreased will get this remedy-the whole value of the land. Those
whose land value is diminished a smaller amount-but not enough to
rise to the "too far" level-will receive nothing at all. And the rest of
those subject to the regulation will see an increase in value.
Most people would also be troubled by the government paying
so much without getting anything in return. At least in Lucas the state
got the title to the land after paying its value to the landowner.
Moreover, this remedy cannot accommodate future changes. If
the regulation is ever repealed, the landowner will have land worth "full
67. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly could go on if
to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law.").
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value" as well as a pot of money from the government that supposedly
represents the diminution value caused by the now non-existent
regulation. The same problem also arises if the regulation later results in
an increase in value.68
Limit the Percentage by Paying the Amount Diminished by the
Regulation
Under the cases applying the Penn Central analysis, the
percentage diminutions that have not resulted in any remedy for the
landowners have ranged from quite small to more than 90 percent. 69 If
there were a recognized or mandated percentage below which it is
determined that the Penn Central factors do not support a taking and
above which a taking has occurred, then one possible remedy would be
to grant the landowner the difference. Thus, if the regulation diminished
the value of the owner's property five percent more than the limit, the
damages would be five percent of the value of the land.
This remedy would compensate the landowner only to
the
extent that the diminishment went above the amount of diminution of
value that would not be "too far." Here, at least, we do not see a
windfall-the compensated landowner and the landowner who receives
nothing remain in nearly the same financial position, and both are still
subject to the regulation.
The first problem with this seemingly straightforward remedy is
that the courts would have to establish the allowable percentage of
diminution. Thus far, no court has been willing to suggest that a
particular fixed percentage is the limit. Paying the landowner the
amount necessary to bring the harm to the acceptable limit recognized in
one case may be more than is required in another, and not enough in yet
another.
68. A similar type of remedy was enacted by ballot initiative in Oregon in 2004. See
Pre-Election Review of Proposed Initiative from Office of Secretary of State Bill Bradbury
(Mar. 17, 2003), availableat http://www.friends.org/issues/documents/M37/M37text.pdf.
Although somewhat different in approach, and not required by the constitution, many of
the problems with the remedy were suggested in the arguments against the initiative. See,
e.g., Take a Closer Look, Committee, No on 37, at http://www.takeacloserlook
oregon.com/ (last visited May 4, 2006); Measure 37: An Endless Tide of Lawsuits (Oct. 23,
2004), at http://www.blueoregon.com/2004/10/measure 37_an-e.html.
69. In Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377 (1992), the
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a takings challenge to a local ordinance limiting the
permissible depth of a quarry that reduced the value of the plaintiff's land by over 90
percent, and in Gove v. Zoning Board ofAppeals of Chatham, 831 N.E.2d 864 (Mass. 2005), the
court upheld a regulation that prohibited building on a lot, reducing its value from
$346,000 to $23,000.
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This remedy creates the same randomness we see in the present
decision making by making nearly impossible any predictions of when a
regulation results in an "unconstitutional taking" and when it instead
results only in a diminishment in value that, according to Holmes, we
simply have to accept.70
Other problems parallel those discussed above: If a landowner is
paid the percentage difference, she still owns the title to all her land,
while the government has received nothing for its payment. If changes
are made later - if the regulation is amended to be more permissive, or if
the regulation's effect on the value of the land becomes more positiveshould the court require a refund of the landowner's windfall? If the
riparian owners in Stupak-Thrall had been awarded some percentage of
the amount their business would have been diminished by the
regulation, what would the state's remedy be if it turned-out that the
business actually improved because of the increased peace and quiet?
Would the landowner be required to keep the funds in a separate
account in the event the loss was reversed?
This remedy would also produce a great deal of resentment
among landowners: Since the regulation is valid, most landowners
would have to bear the burden on their land. Paying a few affected
landowners some amount while giving nothing to the rest would seem
quite unjust to those not paid. 71
Both this remedy and the "entire pay" remedy are also highly
speculative, particularly when the court is contemplating unimproved
ground with no present uses and no structures and is forced to decide
how much that land is worth and how much it will be worth after a
regulation has been imposed.
Resolving these sorts of problems would require a vast
expenditure of resources. The landowner would have to pay valuation
experts, as would the state, and the court process would be time
consuming and costly. Only those landowners with deep pockets could
avail themselves of this remedy; to everyone else affected, it would
appear arbitrary and capricious.
Temporary Taking Compensation
Here the court would allow monthly compensation for the value
lost by the imposition of a regulation that goes "too far." This remedy
would avoid the problems of changing conditions such as an actual
increase in the value of the property. However, this remedy would
70.
71.

Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413
See web sites cited supra note 68.
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generate yet more costs, particularly on the part of the government.
Further, given the speculative nature of all the necessary calculations, it
would no doubt give rise to a significant amount of litigation, as
landowners sought to increase the monthly stipend paid and
governments sought to lower it.
The administrative costs of this and the other hypothetical
remedies would in themselves likely be prohibitive. And whose experts
would make the necessary evaluations? 72
Allow Some of the Prohibited Use
Here the court would allow some of the uses the regulation
prohibits to make up for the regulation's going "too far." For example, in
our historical preservation hypothetical, the court could allow the
landowner to undertake some degree of historically inaccurate, yet
cheaper, renovation.
This remedy is in the nature of a variance, which is, of course, a
fine remedy, but it is a traditional due process remedy, not compensation.
CONCLUSION: REGULATORY "TAKINGS" OR RHETORIC?
The Supreme Court continues to contend that lower courts
should treat regulations that go "too far" as takings, while the lower
courts, sensing the irrationality of this approach, continue to grant
injunctions for invalid regulations and compensation for real takings.
The reason for the lack of "valid regulatory takings" cases is that the
courts implicitly recognize that there is no such thing as a valid
regulatory taking deserving of "just compensation." The lack of
appropriate cases perhaps says more about the issue than a critique of a
series of wrong-headed decisions. There is unlikely to be a rational and
fair measure of damages for a valid regulatory "taking," assuming that
there is such a thing as a valid regulatory "taking" at all.
To conclude with our canine theme, using the takings template
to fight land use regulation by setting a workable damage remedy has
been met with a resounding silence of judicial opinion. Not only does
this dog not bark, this dog will not hunt. If the U.S. Supreme Court
cannot figure out what is, and what is not, a regulatory "taking" from
72. As Laura S. Underkuffler writes in THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND
POWER 44 (2003), "The idea that compensation must be paid whenever the individual's preexisting property rights are changed by government is one at which 'common sense
revolts." (quoting United States. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946)).
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case to case, perhaps the lower courts should be forgiven their failure to
determine a rational, applicable damage remedy for such cases.
The takings clause works well in those cases that it was designed
to address, and the courts have very little trouble in those cases applying
a takings remedy. When the government takes land for a road or for a
post office, the previous owner of the land gets paid for the land. While
there are arguments about how to value the land,73 that is fundamentally
a technical valuation question, not a constitutional one. The controversy
over the phrase "for public use" that spawned the recent Kelo 74 case is
troublesome, but even in that situation, the remedy issue is clear: if the
government can and does take your land for the contested purpose, it
must pay you for it.
In marked contrast to its application to "real takings" cases, the
takings clause has proven to be an inadequate and confusing vehicle for
questions relating to the justification for and validity of regulations that
affect how landowners use their land. Whereas an analysis under the
Due Process Clause not only makes more logical sense, but would result
in clear decisions and remedies, we instead have the present morass
under the takings clause-with the takings clause remedy
(compensation) granted in some cases and a due process remedy
(injunctions) in others. Tellingly, the remedies the courts actually grant
in regulatory "takings" cases are an implicit recognition that those cases
are not about the government taking property, but about the
landowner's due process rights.

73.
74.

See Salzberg, supra note 2, at 435.
Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).

